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We develop a theoretical framework exploring firm corruption accounting for 
interactions with an auditor who provides auditing and other services. A multiplicity of 
equilibria can exist including stable corruption and auditor controlled corruption. Whilst 
fining the auditor cannot eliminate all corruption, fining the firm can, but marginal 
increases in this fine can also have perverse effects. Investing in corruption detection may be 
effective in deterring auditor corruption but ineffective in deterring firm corruption. Policy 
effectiveness is highly dependent upon several factors which may be hard to observe in 
practice making general rules about policy interventions to address corruption very 
difficult.  
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1    Introduction 
This paper focuses on the role of firms and the incentives they face within the context of 
complex interplay between institutions, government and firms in determining opportunities for 
engaging in rent-seeking behaviour and corrupt activity. Previous research has largely focused 
on corruption where government or other state actors play the central role, typically in a 
procurement or government tendering context, where if firms are involved their role is 
typically reactive (see, for example Rose-Ackerman, 1999, 2007; Lessmann and Markwardt, 
2010; Waller et al, 2012; Wadho, 2016; Dufwenberg and Spagnolo, 2015). Corruption within 
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extraction industries, including non-renewable resource sectors, is one possible exception 
(see, for example Arezki, 2011). Nonetheless, firm level corruption has been a significant 
problem. Between 1997 and 2002, nearly 10 per cent of US listed companies restated their 
earnings at least once due to accounting irregularities (cited in Aglietta and Reberioux, 2005). 
In addition, earnings restatements were effected in 414 cases involving US based firms in 
2004 because of financial irregularities (cited in Coffee, 2005). The empirical work reported in 
Goel (2014) also suggests the importance of a firm level orientation. He finds, using US data for 
1970-2009, that there is a significant positive link between corporate political action 
committees and corruption. These irregularities provide a background for Jensen’s (2006, 
p.14) reference, while discussing the overvaluation of equity in the late 1990s and early 
2000s, to the prevalence of: “... misleading data from managers, large numbers of naive 
investors, and breakdowns in the agency relationship within companies, in investment banks, 
and in Audit and law firms many of whom knowingly contributed to the misinformation that 
fed the overvaluation.” 
A similar view is presented by Stiglitz (2003, p.244), who, whilst discussing Enron 
suggests that: “It appears that its [Enron’s] chief financial officer made the same discovery that so 
many other corporate executives made during the nineties: the same accounting tricks that 
could be used to distort information to boost stock market prices could be used to enrich 
themselves at the expense of other shareholders.” Key issues emerge from the Jensen-Stiglitz 
opinions cited here. Firm corruption involves (a) a breakdown in agency relationships; (b) 
misleading activity not only by managers but also by audit firms (for example); and (c) 
‘accounting tricks’ that were increasingly becoming standard. Given these, it is apparent that 
only some firms were corrupt, even though (following Stiglitz) the ‘tricks’ were becoming 
standard. The 414 cases of earnings restatements is a significant number but a small 
proportion of the total number of US firms. Hence many firms decided not to do what 
was apparently ‘standard’ practice. A preliminary conclusion might therefore suggest itself: 
a breakdown in agency relationships is a necessary but not sufficient condition for firm 
corruption. Sufficiency would appear to require (1) an agency breakdown in the relationship 
between firms and their owners; (2) a willingness on the part of firms to exploit this and 
engage in ‘tricks’; and possibly also (3) collusion by supporting actors (e.g. auditing firms) in 
the ‘tricks’. 
While the basic idea in our framework is that firm corruption involves collusion between firms 
and auditors, a central problem exists in this relationship where auditors provide auditing and 
other consultancy services. The extent of these ‘other’ services depends on firm profitability 
i.e. the ability to buy them. In turn, firm and auditor profitabilities increase with corruption. 
This can provide an incentive for, not only firm corruption, but also auditor collusion in this 
corruption. The core problem analysed in this paper has, of course, been recognised by 
other authors. For example Posner (2006, p. 11) gives a characteristically pithy summary of 
DIETRICH, MCHARDY, SHARMA     Firm Corruption in the Presence of an Auditor 
 
 99
the core idea for the current discussion: “Corporate executives, moreover, hire and pay the 
auditors who certify the correctness of the corporation’s financial statements, dangle consulting 
contracts in front of auditors who also offer consulting services.” Our work is also related in 
parts to Pagano and Immordino (2007) and Ravikumar and Zhang (2012) who consider a 
similar question involving optimal auditing. However, rather than optimal auditing per se, this 
work recognises the importance of viewing auditing in a strategic context consistent with these 
other contributions, and focuses on the circumstances under which corruption can be an 
equilibrium outcome. 
In this paper a framework is developed that assumes agency breakdown has occurred and 
explores the possibility of firms exploiting this and possible collusion by auditing firms. The 
framework applies to corruption aimed at financial gain by both firm and auditor and when this 
leads to a stable (equilibrium) outcome. 1  Ideas akin to the firm/agent collusion in the 
corruption process have been addressed elsewhere in the literature. Lambert-Mogiliansky 
and Sonin (2006) analyse corruption and collusion in procurement.  They argue that a 
corrupt agent would be willing to ‘sell’ his decision in return for a bribe. They also argue 
that the risks of collusion and of corruption need to be addressed simultaneously and indicate 
the potential for an external agent (an auctioneer) in having a role in providing the conditions 
which allow the stability of corruption and extracting of rents. The idea that an external agent 
may facilitate corruption as a stable equilibrium is used in this paper, but the emphasis is 
shifted from the external agent being an auctioneer to being an auditor.  Carrillo (2000) 
constructs a dynamic model of corruption within which agents are aware of their ‘propensity 
for corruption’ and their clients choose an optimal level of bribe to be offered. Such a 
framework provides an explanation for different implicit prices for illegal services (bribes or 
kick-backs) for similar countries (or organisations within similar countries), based on an analysis 
of reaction of clients. These ideas are carried forward into the current discussion: that there is a 
propensity for corruption and that the reactions of other agents (here auditors) are important 
for the equilibria that can be generated. In a context similar to this paper, Samuel (2009) 
employs a principal (or regulator), a supervisor (similar to our auditor) and firms, and 
considers a situation where the supervisor expends considerable effort to obtain information 
which, if revealed, would lead to the agent being fined with a given probability. Of course, 
the supervisor may collude with the agent and hide this adverse information in exchange for a 
                                                 
1 To illustrate the limits to the current discussion reference can be made to the case of Olympus. It is 
widely reported in the press that senior management in this company attempted to use corrupt accounting 
practices to cover investment losses. But two characteristics of this case suggest that it cannot be analysed 
using the framework developed here. First, the senior managers involved apparently did not make any 
personal financial gain from the corrupt practices. Second, while auditor collusion existed the suggestion 
is that the practices involved were incompetence rather than profit based. The framework developed here 
cannot cover corruption of this type. 
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bribe. It is shown that raising the supervisor’s reward discourages such ex-post corruption, but 
it can lead to increased pre-emptive collusion and corrupt behaviour. 
Whilst corruption can take various forms, the approach adopted here concentrates on corrupt 
practices within a private firm sector in the form of misuse of corporate assets, as discussed, for 
example, in Svensson (2005). In particular a game theoretic framework is developed that 
examines incentives for firms to be corrupt given market-based monitoring by an auditor and to 
examine whether, and in what circumstances, stable, equilibrium corruption is possible.  
Mishra (2006) demonstrates that a high level of corruption or a low level of compliance 
can become an equilibrium outcome, in spite of anti-corruption efforts. However, unlike our 
study, Mishra’s analysis is based on evolutionary dynamics and involves social norms. It is 
chieﬂy directed at hierarchical and government type bureaucracies, rather than market based 
ﬁrms. The possibility of multiple equilibria involving corruption arising in the firm/agent 
context is demonstrated by Çule and Fulton (2009), although here the ‘agent’ interacting with 
the firm is a tax inspector and collusion involves bribes aimed at reducing tax liability.  
Our paper makes contributions as follows. We explore firm corruption within a private 
sector, corporate decision making context. This is a relatively ignored area within the 
literature which tends to focus on government and government procurement related 
corruption. The firm corruption model developed here shows that multiple equilibria can arise. 
These solutions can be interpreted as a theoretical equivalent of the multiple behaviours 
observed in practice. Key equilibria, in terms of the objectives of the discussion, are the 
possibility of stable corruption but also auditor controlled corruption. In terms of possible 
policy implications that follow from the framework developed here, the following contributions 
are important. First, we demonstrate that fining the auditor cannot eliminate all corruption; this 
is arguably an important and counter-intuitive finding. Secondly, we also show that fining the 
firm can eliminate corruption. But, marginal increases in the firm’s fine can also have 
perverse policy effects. A clear finding is that investing in corruption detection can be 
effective in controlling auditor corruption but ineffective in deterring firm corruption. Finally, 
we conclude that policy effectiveness is highly dependent upon several factors which are hard 
to observe in practice. This makes it hard to formulate general rules about policy 
interventions for addressing corruption, and hence indicates the potential relevance of a case 
by case approach. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. The next section develops key assumptions 
involved with a corruption game and develops the theoretical model. Section three specifies 
explicit payoffs. Section four explores possible policy options for the players and 
regulatory body and identifies the extent to which players and the regulator can influence the 
equilibria of the game. The final section of the paper highlights a number of key policy 
conclusions that follow from the framework developed here. 
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2    The corruption game 
This paper considers the scenario of a firm that has the option of pursuing a profit- 
making corrupt prospect in the knowledge that such corrupt activity would be detected by its 
auditor. However, the firm also purchases consultancy services from the auditor. We 
consider whether there are conditions under which corruption may be an equilibrium and 
examine the effectiveness of various regulatory policy interventions in dealing with 
corruption. We now set out the key modelling assumptions which underlie the framework of the 
corruption game. 
In addition to Nature (N), the game has two players: a Monopolist (M) and an Auditor 
(A). The players are risk neutral and expected profit maximisers. Each player’s action set has 
two elements: Corrupt (C )  and Honest (H ) . The players choose their actions sequentially 
over two periods: the Monopolist is assumed to be the leader and the Auditor the follower. 
Hence, with subscripts denoting the period {1,2}, we have: Period 1: M chooses {ܥଵ, ܪଵ}; 
Period 2: A chooses [ … , {ܥଶ, ܪଶ}]. The game is one of complete and symmetric information 
allowing us to solve the game by backward induction. Consequently, when the Auditor selects its 
action, {ܥଵ, ܪଵ} is known. 
We now begin to set out the pay-offs in the game. In the absence of corruption the 
Monopolist earns an exogenous non-corrupt gross profit: Πெு > 0 . The Monopolist buys 
(compulsory) auditing services and additional consultancy services from the Auditor. Ex-ante 
the returns to the consultancy services are uncertain. As both agents are risk neutral they share 
this risk with a contract that has payment based upon expected returns. A constant 
proportion ߙ ∈ [0,1) of the Monopolist’s profit is allocated to purchase Auditor consultancy 
services. The Monopolist’s gross non-corrupt profit reflects productive and market 
characteristics and benefits from these Auditor services. If in the first stage of the game the 
Monopolist opts for the Honest action, rather than Corrupt choice, then after taking into 
account the costs of the Auditor’s consulting services, the Monopolist’s net non-corrupt 
profit is: Πெ {ܪଵ, … } ≡ Πெு (1 − ߙ). 
We now characterise corruption opportunities in the game. The Monopolist has an 
opportunity to undertake a corrupt activity yielding income ߛ(݃) Πெு .  The parameter 
݃ ∈ [0, ∞)  measures the extent of the corrupt activity whilst ߛ(݃)  is a (production) 
function which determines the value of corruption income relative to the exogenous non- 
corrupt gross Monopoly profit. The (production) function ߛ(݃)  is continuous and concave on 
g, reflecting diminishing returns: ߛ(݃) > 0, ߛᇱᇱ(݃), ∀݃ ∈ (0, ∞).  Corruption produces an 
additional gross profit gain (before taking into account consultancy fees and any penalties 
for detected corruption) to the Monopolist over the non-corrupt gross Monopoly profit: 
Πெ஼ ≡ (1 + ߛ(݃))Πெு .  
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The game is illustrated in extensive form in Figure 1. Nodes M and N relate to the 
Monopolist and Nature, respectively, and nodes ܣଵ  and ܣଶ  relate to the Auditor. Payoffs 
(which are derived in Section 3) are reported in parentheses. 
It is important to note that in this paper the level of corruption g is not a (continuous) 
choice variable of the Monopolist. Rather, the Monopolist faces a discrete choice between 
not being corrupt {ܪଵ, … }  and pursuing a corrupt prospect, ݃∗ , under {ܥଵ, … } , of value 
ߛ(݃∗) Πெு . This reflects the fact that in many cases a firm may have a limited set of 
opportunities for corrupt activities making g discrete rather than continuous. The assumption 
also enables a simplified analysis, not least by eliminating the need to determine an optimal 
level of g. Indeed, to further simplify matters, we allow the discrete prospect to be the open 
ball with centre ݃∗ and radius ߩ. Assuming ߩ to be sufficiently small means that we can avoid 
uninteresting mixed strategy Nash equilibria in the game which are defined only on point values 
of g∗.2 
In the second stage of the game, the Auditor makes its choice between Corrupt and 
Honest having observed the action of the Monopolist in the first stage of the game. If the 
Monopolist has chosen to be corrupt and the Auditor opts for honesty {ܥଵ, ܪଶ} , then the 
Monopolist is penalised with a fine ܨெ > 0 with certainty. In the case where both players 
choose to be corrupt the payoff to each agent is uncertain as Nature assigns a probability 
ߪ(݃) to the corrupt activity being detected. If the corruption is detected a strictly positive 
                                                 
2 Hence, where such a special case arises we let the Monopolist move infinitesimally to the left or the 
right of ݃∗ into an interval of g characterised by a pure strategy Nash equilibrium in such a way that it is 
at least no worse off. 
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penalty is imposed on both Monopolist ( ܨெ > 0)  and Auditor ( ܨ஺ > 0 ). Under the 
assumptions of the game, the players’ payoffs following Nature’s actions under {ܥଵ, ܥଶ} can be 
represented by an ‘expected’ payoff with probability weights ߪ(݃) and 1 − ߪ(݃). Note, that 
by restricting the action set of the two players to {ܥ, ܪ} we rule out any action on the part of 
the Auditor that would involve it misleading the regulatory authorities by indicating that the 
Monopolist has been corrupt when it has not been corrupt as well as any retaliation by the 
Monopolist to {ܥଵ, ܪଶ}.3 The implication of this is that we can restrict analysis to a two-stage, 
rather than three-stage, game. 
In the main, costs are not specified explicitly within the model (they play an unspecified 
role in Πு  and ߱(݃), defined later), however, the following assumption introduces a cost 
differential for the Auditor under corruption relative to honest behaviour. We assume that the 
Auditor incurs a cost ஺ܿ associated with supplying services to the Monopolist. These costs 
are higher under {ܥଵ, ܥଶ}  than under { … , ܪଶ} : ஺ܿ஼ > ஺ܿு . The cost differential is defined 
△ ܿ ≡ ஺ܿ஼ − ஺ܿு > 0 and is assumed to be constant (not a function of the level of corruption) 
and △ ܿ < ߙܨெ.4 We argue that the positive differential is a sensible assumption given the 
higher transaction costs involved with hiding corrupt practices.5  
2.1  Payoff specification and equilibria 
In this subsection we specify an explicit payoff structure for the corruption game set out above. 
First, the payoffs corresponding to ݖ in Figure 1 are: 
ݖெ ≡ Πெ {ܪଵ, ܪଶ} ≡ Πெ {ܪଵ, ܥଶ} ≡ (1 − ߙ)Πெு    (1a) 
ݖ஺ ≡ Π஺ {ܪଵ, ܪଶ} ≡ Π஺ {ܪଵ, ܥଶ} ≡ ߙΠெு − ܿ஺ு   (1b) 
Given the Monopolist faces a certain punishment cost of ܨெ if the Auditor does not support 
its corruption, the payoffs corresponding to ݕ in Figure 1 are: 
ݕெ ≡ Πெ {ܥଵ, ܪଶ} ≡ (1 − ߙ)[൫1 + ߛ(݃)൯Πெு − ܨெ]  (2a) 
ݕ஺ ≡ Π஺ {ܥଵ, ܪଶ} ≡ ߙ[൫1 + ߛ(݃)൯Πெு − ܨெ] − ܿ஺ு  (2b) 
                                                 
3 This restriction of the model seems reasonable because if the Monopolist sacks the Auditor for failing to 
support a corrupt strategy this would involve public disclosure of the corruption. 
4 In a broader model than that set out here this positive cost differential could be reinforced by the 
expected costs due to reputational damage to the Auditor under the corrupt option in terms, for instance, of 
lost future earnings. 
5 As we see later (after Lemma 2), △ ܿ < ߙܨெ  ensures that the set of values of g for which the 
Auditor would support corruption is non-empty. 
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If the Auditor colludes in the corruption the probability of corruption being detected is ߪ(݃). 
If the Auditor is found to be corrupt there is a punishment cost of ܨ஺. In the case that corruption 
is not detected, the payoff to the Monopolist and Auditor, corresponding to ݔᇱ in Figure 1, are 
respectively: 
ݔெᇱ ≡ (1 − ߙ)[൫1 + ߛ(݃)൯Πெு ]    (3a) 
ݔ஺ᇱ ≡ ߙ[൫1 + ߛ(݃)൯Πெு ] − ܿ஺஼     (3b) 
whilst the payoffs, if they are caught (corresponding to ݔᇱᇱ in Figure 1), are respectively: 
ݔெᇱᇱ ≡ (1 − ߙ)[൫1 + ߛ(݃)൯Πெு − ܨெ]    (4a) 
ݔ஺ᇱᇱ ≡ ߙൣ൫1 + ߛ(݃)൯Πெு − ܨெ൧ − ܿ஺஼ − ܨ஺   (4b) 
Hence, the expected payoffs to the Monopolist and Auditor under {ܥଵ, ܥଶ} are: 
ݔெ ≡ ܧ(Πெ {ܥଵ, ܥଶ}) ≡ (1 − ߙ)[൫1 + ߛ(݃)൯Πெு − ߪ(݃)ܨெ]  (5a) 
ݔ஺ ≡ ܧ(Π஺ {ܥଵ, ܥଶ}) ≡ ߙ[൫1 + ߛ(݃)൯Πெு − ߪ(݃)ܨெ] − ܿ஺஼ − ߪ(݃)ܨ஺ (5b) 
The system of equations defined by Eqs. 1, 2 and 5 can be used to derive the conditions under 
which each of the three scenarios in the game is a Unique Perfect Nash Equilibrium (UPNE). 
We begin by identifying the conditions under which each scenario is a UPNE . Given the 
earlier assumption about the discrete nature of the corrupt opportunity ݃∗ available to the 
Monopolist, we rule out any mixed strategy Nash equilibria (which occur in this game only at 
specific individual values of g). 
UPNE 1. This equilibrium involves both the Monopolist and Auditor opting to be corrupt: 
{ܥଵ, ܥଶ}. From Figure 1 this corruption equilibrium requires ݔ஺ > ݕ஺ and ݔெ > ݖெ, hence, 
respectively, from Eqs. 1a, 2a, 5a and 5b: 
ఙ(௚)ிಲା∆௖
ଵିఙ(௚) < ߙܨெ     (6a) 
ஈಾಹ
ிಾ ߛ(݃) > ߪ(݃)    (6b) 
Hence, from Eq. 6a, the Auditor’s share (ߙ) of the penalty (ܨெ), that the monopolist doesn’t 
incur under undetected corruption, weighted by the probability of this event (1 − ߪ(݃)) is 
greater than the additional cost to the Auditor of it covering up the corruption (∆ܿ) plus the 
penalty it pays for being caught colluding in the corruption (ܨ஺) weighted by the probability of 
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this event (ߪ(݃)). The inequality in Eq. 6b simply requires that the gain in profit for the 
Monopolist under undetected corruption is greater than the penalty to the Monopolist weighted 
by the probability of detection. 
UPNE 2. {ܥଵ, ܪଶ} This equilibrium involves attempted Monopoly corruption controlled by the 
Auditor. In terms of Figure 1 it requires ݔ஺ < ݕ஺ and ݕெ > ݖெ, hence, respectively, from Eqs. 
1a, 2a, 2b and 5b: 
ఙ(௚)ிಲା∆௖
ଵିఙ(௚) > ߙܨெ     (7a) 
ஈಾಹ
ிಾ ߛ(݃) > 1     (7b) 
Hence, for the Auditor, the expected value of the Auditor’s fine plus the costs of it 
covering up the corruption are greater than the expected gains from covering up the 
corruption in terms of the consultancy income for the Auditor (i.e. if the corruption is not 
detected then the Monopolist will not be fined ܨெ  and the Auditor will gain consultancy 
income of ߙܨெ  from this). For the Monopolist, the value of the gain in profit from the 
corrupt activity exceeds the value of the fine. 
UPNE 3. {ܪଵ, ܪଶ} ≡ {ܪଵ, ܥଶ}  This ‘honesty’ equilibrium arises under two different sets of 
circumstances, if: (i) ݔ஺ > ݕ஺, ݖெ > ݔெ , requiring, respectively Eq. 6a and: 
ஈಾಹ
ிಾ ߛ(݃) < ߪ(݃)    (8a) 
and (ii) ݔ஺ < ݕ஺, ݖெ > ݕெ, requiring, respectively Eq. 7a,  and: 
ஈಾಹ
ிಾ ߛ(݃) < 1     (8b) 
Remark 1. For completeness, note, there are no pure strategy pure Nash equilibria (PNE) 
under ݔ஺ >  ݕ஺ where either (i) ݔெ >  ݖெ > ݕெ , or (ii) ݕெ >  ݖெ > ݔெ . 
Hence, in the first case, the Auditor’s expected gain from hiding the corruption is positive 
but the Monopolist’s expected gain from corruption is negative. In the second case, the fine 
for the Monopolist, which will happen with certainty given the Auditor will be honest, is less 
than the gain in profit due to the corrupt activity. 
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2.2    Corruption detection and corruption technology profiles 
The main results of our paper will depend upon the size of the corruption prospect 
available to the Monopolist, ݃∗ , and the properties of ߛ(݃)  and ߪ(݃)  which collectively 
determine the size of the “expected” reward to corrupt activity for the players. In order to 
formalise the analysis, we will make some assumptions about the properties of ߛ(݃) and 
ߪ(݃). We begin with the relationship ߪ(݃), which we term as the corruption detection profile. 
The functional form of this term determines how the probability of detected collusion 
varies with the size of the corrupt prospect. 
We introduce the first of a number of critical values of g that will be helpful in specifying 
the properties of ߪ(݃). 
Definition 1.  ො݃ ≡ ݂݅݊{݃: ߪ(݃) = 1} 
We now introduce two specifications of the corruption detection profile, ߪ௝(݃) ݆ ∈ {1,2}. In 
both cases ߪ(0) = 0, however ߪଵ(݃) is strictly convex and monotonically increasing until 
݃ = ො݃, where it reaches unity and remains at unity for all ݃ > ො݃. On the other hand, ߪଶ(݃) is 
strictly concave and monotonically increasing everywhere with limit ܶ < 1. The two profiles 
are illustrated in Figure 2, where the y-axis is the probability of detection. 
Thus, σ(g) is positive monotonic for σ(g)<1, which would appear to be reasonable as 
higher levels of corruption, g, are likely to be more conspicuous and hence more likely to be 
detected. 
 
Figure 2: Corruption Detection Profiles 
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In the case of ߪଵ(݃), sufficiently high levels of corrupt activity will eventually result in the 
corruption being detected with certainty. However under ߪଶ(݃)  higher levels of corrupt 
activity will raise the probability of detection but never to the extent that corruption will be 
detected with certainty. 
We now turn to the specific question of the circumstances under which the Auditor will 
choose corruption over honesty for which the term ߮(ߪ) is instrumental. The key properties 
of this term are set out in the following Lemma. 
Lemma 1.6 ߮(ߪ) ≡ ఙଵିఙ ܨ஺ +
௱௖
ଵିఙ  is: (i) positive monotonic in ߪ , (ii) convex in ߪ , (iii) 
݈݅݉ఙ→ଵష ߮(ߪ) = ∞, and (iv) (weakly) increasing in (ܨ஺) ߂ܿ. 
As we will see, this result is of some importance in delivering Lemma 2. The following critical 
value, where it exists, is useful in identifying the optimal action of the Auditor in this game. 
Definition 2. Let ݃∗∗ ≡ {݃: ߮൫ߪ(݃)൯ = ߙܨெ}. 
We are now able to state the following Lemma. 
Lemma 2. The Auditor will support Monopoly corruption (be honest) iff  
࣌(ࢍ∗) < [>]࣌(ࢍ∗∗)  and   hence    ࢍ∗ < [>]ࢍ∗∗. 
Hence, ݃ ∗∗ defines the level of corruption which produces a detection probability under which the 
Auditor is indifferent between {ܥଵ, ܪଶ} and {ܥଵ, ܥଶ} and that for ݃ ∗ < [>]݃∗∗ the Auditor would 
support [not support] a corrupt Monopolist. Illustrating with reference to Figure 3, the Auditor 
will choose to be corrupt if the corruption prospect ݃ ∗ available to the Monopolist is smaller 
than ݃ ∗∗ and so in the case depicted, the Auditor will choose to be corrupt. 
The role of Lemma 1 is now clear. Given, by assumption, Δܿ < ߙܨெ , at ߪ = 0 we 
have ߮(0) < ߙܨெ  and hence the Auditor is honest. Since ߮(ߪ)  is monotonically 
increasing, there is an open interval (0, ߪ(݃∗∗))  for which ߮(ߪ) < ߙܨெ , and hence the 
Auditor supports corruption, despite a strictly positive probability of detection. Further, that 
߮(ߪ)  is convex and asymptotic to ߪ = 1 , and ߙܨெ  is finite, ensures that there is a 
probability of detection at which the Auditor is honest: ߮(ߪ) crosses the line ߙܨெ . Of 
course, the critical probability here is lower as Δܿ is closer to ߙܨெ, and/or the function ߮(ߪ) 
is more convex. 
In order to help understand the factors affecting the choice of the Monopolist we now 
introduce the corruption technology profile, ߱ (݃) ≡ ஈಾಹிಾ ߛ(݃). This profile relates the level of g to the reward available to the Monopolist from being corrupt relative to the fine if caught.  
                                                 
6 Where proofs are provided they are reported in the Appendix. 
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Figure 3: Auditor’s Decision 
 
We focus attention on this term, rather than just the underlying ߛ(݃) term, because of the 
importance of the relative Monopolist reward to corruption in determining the outcome of the 
game - note ߱(݃) is the L.H.S. of Eqs. 6b and 7b, and so on. Some properties of ߱ (݃) are 
set out below. 
Lemma 3. ω(g) is (i) continuous, and (ii) strictly concave. 
Hence ߱(݃)  is concave reflecting diminishing returns to corruption as implied by the 
properties of ߛ(݃). The following defines a further critical value of g which is important for 
characterising the properties of ߱ (݃) 
Definition 3.  Let g෤ ≡ inf{g: ω(g) = 1}. 
We can now outline the relationships between the level of Monopolist corruption and the return 
to corruption, specifying two corruption technology profiles, ߱ ௜(݃) (݅ ∈ {ܽ, ܾ}), illustrated in 
Figure 4.  In addition to the properties of ߱(݃)  in Lemma 3 (continuity and strict 
concavity), we have that: ߱௔(݃)  and ߱௕(݃)  exhibit ‘weak’ diminishing returns (so that 
although strictly concave, they are monotonically increasing in g and don’t have downward 
sloping sections) tending to limits of ܸ > 1 and ܵ < 1, respectively. Hence, the additional 
income from the corrupt activity is always greater than the cost (not including any 
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Figure 4: Two Corruption Technology Profiles ࣓࢏(ࢍ) (࢏ ∈ {ࢇ, ࢈}) 
 
detection penalties) of undertaking the corrupt activity. We select these functional forms not 
with an intention of explaining every possible technology but rather to show how different 
types of technology will support different equilibria and have different implications for policy 
making whilst keeping the analysis as straightforward as possible.  Combinations of the two 
corruption technology profiles, ω_i (g) (i∈{a,b}), and the two corruption detection profiles, 
σ_j (g) (j∈{1,2}), give rise to four cases which we label Case ji. 
To make the analysis manageable and for simplicity, we stipulate that the two functions ߱ 
and ߪ only cross at most once to the left of ො݃ i.e. where ߪ is strictly upward sloping. These 
Case classifications will help identify conditions under which certain outcomes of policy 
actions are, and are not, effective. The following critical values of g are useful in 
characterising the relationship between ߱ (݃) and ߪ(݃). 
Definition 4. Let  (i) gത ≡ inf{g: ω(g) = σ(g), g ∈ ℝାା};  
    (ii) gതത ≡ sup{g: ω(g) = σ(g)} 
A non-exhaustive set of examples of the four cases are illustrated in Figure 5 where critical 
values of g are indicated selectively. The solid black lines represent ߪ(݃) whilst the grey 
lines represent ߱(݃). As will become clear later, the outcome of the game will depend on 
the relative position of certain critical values of g and ݃∗.  
The different grey lines in Figure 5 serve to offer an illustration of what can happen to the 
relative position of critical values of g as either σ(g) stretches up and/or to the right or ω(g) 
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shifts upwards and/or to the left. Again, these are not exhaustive but help in understanding 
aspects of the policy analysis in Section 3. In particular, policy outcomes will depend on such 
things as whether ω(0) is steeper or flatter than σ(0) and the limit of σ_2 (g) (T) lies above or 
below the limit of ω_b (g) (S). 
 
Figure 5: Examples of the Relationship between Corruption Technology profile ࣓࢏(ࢍ) 
(࢏ ∈ {ࢇ, ࢈}) and the Corruption Detection Profile ࣌࢐(ࢍ) (࢐ ∈ {ࢇ, ࢈}) in the Cases ࢐࢏  
 
Key: Black - Corruption detection profile ߪ(݃); Grey - Corruption technology 
profile ߱(݃) (i) Grey Solid - ߪ′(0) > ߱′(0) (ii) Grey Dash - ߪ′(0) < ߱′(0) and 
ො݃ < ෤݃; (iii) Grey Dots - ߪ′(0) < ߱′(0) and ො݃ > ෤݃ 
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2.3   Some properties of the model 
Remembering that ݃ ∗ is not a (continuous) choice variable, there is a clear way of ranking the 
three UPNE from a public policy point of view at a given level of ݃∗. UPNE3 is the most 
desirable outcome as this involves the guarantee of no corrupt activity. UPNE1 is clearly the 
least desirable outcome as corrupt activities may be going on undetected. UPNE2 is an 
improvement upon UPNE1 inasmuch as corruption, although it is not prevented, is 
detected through the functioning of the Auditor. Similarly, cases where UPNE2 supports 
unconstrained corruption may involve very high levels of abuse which, though not avoided, are 
detected, whilst unconstrained corruption under UPNE1 may be very high and go undetected. 
Definition 5. Labeling UPNEk (݇ ∈ {1,2,3} ), corruption equilibria are monotonically 
‘worsening’ [‘improving’] in ݃ ∗ if increasing ݃ ∗ leads to smaller [larger] ݇  for ∀݃∗ ∈ (0, ∞). 
Under Definition 5, Figure 6 illustrates examples of monotonically improving, worsening, and 
non-monotonic orderings of UPNEk with increases in the size of the corruption prospect, ݃∗. 
Figure 6(i) illustrates the case of a non monotonic ordering of UPNEk with increases in ݃∗. For 
݃∗ < ݃∗∗ we have UPNE1 with both Auditor and Monopolist choosing corruption. However, 
raising ݃ ∗  above ݃ ∗∗  but below ݃ ̅  yields UPNE2, with further increases yielding, respectively 
UPNE3, for ݃∗ between ݃̅ and ෤݃, and UPNE2, for ݃∗ above g˜. Figure 6(ii) also begins with 
UPNE1, then UPNE2 but, for ݃∗   above ݃̅ , yields UPNE3, and so is monotonically 
improving with ݃∗ . Conversely, Figure 6(iii) illustrates a situation with UPNE2, for ݃∗ 
below ݃ ̅, and UPNE3, for ݃ ∗ above ݃ ̅. 
Lemma 4. For a given Case  (݅ ∈ {ܽ, ܾ}, ݆ ∈ {1,2}), the associated UPNEk are not always 
monotonically worsening or improving in ݃ ∗. 
Hence, across the possible combinations of corruption technology and detection pro- files, 
there is no uniform pattern of UPNEk worsening or improving as the Monopolist is faced with 
higher levels of the corruption prospect, ݃ ∗. It is useful to identify situations where the ߪ(݃) 
and ߱(݃) profiles yield UPNEk ݇ ∈ {1,2,3} that are effectively unconstrained and those that 
are constrained. We explain what is meant in each case with the help of the following 
Definition. 
Definition 6. (i) UPNEk is said to be unconstrained if ݃∗  is UPNEk for ∀݃ ∈ [݀, ∞) 
where ݀ is finite and ݀ ∈ ℝାା; (ii) UPNEk is said to be constrained if ݃∗ is UPNEk for 
∀݃ ∈ [݀, ݁] where ݀ and ݁ are finite, ݀, ݁ ∈ ℝାା;  and ݀ ≤ ݁. 
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Figure 6: Examples of monotonically improving, worsening and non monotonic orderings of 
UPNEk with increases in ࢍ∗ 
 
The following Lemma is immediately apparent. 
Hence, scenario k which is UPNE at some finite ݃∗, is an unconstrained UPNE for all 
higher levels of g. Otherwise, it is a constrained UPNE .  The following Lemma illustrates 
some circumstances under which our model supports unconstrained UPNE or otherwise. 
Lemma 5. (i) In Case 1݅  ݅ ∈ {ܽ, ܾ} , UPNE1 is never unconstrained; (ii) In Case 1ܽ , 
UPNE2 is always unconstrained; (iii) In Case ݆ܽ  ݆ ∈ {1,2} , UPNE3 is never 
unconstrained; (iv) In Case 2ܽ , UPNE1 [UPNE2] is unconstrained if ܶ < ߪ(݃∗∗)[ܶ >
ߪ(݃∗∗)] ; (v) In Case 2ܽ , UPNE1 [UPNE2] is unconstrained if ܶ < ߪ(݃∗∗)  and ܵ > ܶ 
[ܶ > ߪ(݃∗∗) and S > T ]. 
In this Section we have identified circumstances under which corruption might be an 
equilibrium and indeed when such an equilibrium might be unconstrained inasmuch as it 
remains an equilibrium regardless of how large the corrupt prospect is. In the following 
Section we begin to ask whether the equilibrium for a particular prospect, ݃∗ , can be 
influenced by the Monopolist or regulatory authority. 
3    Policy analysis 
In this Section we consider how the parameters of the model may be manipulated so as to change 
the outcome of the game for a given prospect, ݃ ∗. We analyse in turn the possible impact the 
Monopolist can have on the equilibrium of the game and then consider the policy options 
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available to the regulator to reduce the likelihood of corruption being an equilibrium using 
fines and investing in corruption detection. We also briefly consider the possibility of some 
action by the regulator to reduce the size of a given corrupt prospect ݃∗, which given ߱(݃) is a 
positive monotonic relationship, implies a reduction in the gains to the Monopolist through the 
corrupt option. 
3.1    Monopoly influence 
We begin by asking whether the Monopolist can influence the outcome of the game. Given we are 
assuming that the Monopolist cannot determine the level of corruption, the only other 
candidate for an instrument that the Monopolist might exploit is ߙ , the share of profit 
devoted to Auditor services.7,8  
Proposition 1. If ߱(݃∗) > ߪ(݃∗)  and ߪ(݃∗)  is greater than, but sufficiently close to, 
ߪ(݃∗∗) then the monopolist can increase ߙ strategically to move from UPNE2 to UPNE1. 
Definition 7. If it exists, let ߂ߙ > 0 be the value of ߂ߙ which satisfies both ߪ(݃∗∗, ߙ +
߂ߙ) < ߪ(݃∗)  and ߱(݃∗, ߙ + ߂ߙ) > ߪ(݃∗) , where ߱(݃∗, ߙ) > ߪ(݃∗)  and ߪ(݃∗) >
ߪ(݃∗∗, ߙ). 
Hence, if Δα exists then it is possible for the Monopolist to move the game from UPNE2 
to UPNE1. It follows that the Monopolist may be able to exploit consultancy fees to ‘bribe’ 
the Auditor to be complicit in its corruption. However, although UPNE1 may be ‘better’ than 
UPNE2 for the Monopolist, inasmuch as it moves the Monopolist from a situation of 
incurring the fine ܨெ with certainty, to incurring it with some positive probability ߪ(݃∗) < 1,9 
the above Proposition only establishes that there are circumstances under which it might 
bring about such manipulation of the Auditor. We now address the question regarding the 
conditions under which such manipulation would be in the interests of the Monopolist. 
                                                 
7 It is conceivable that the Monopolist might be able to influence the profile ߛ(݃). However, in order to 
analyse this we would require a formal specification of the costs involved and this lies beyond the scope 
of the current work. 
8 In what follows we allow ߙ to change with no impact on the underlying gross-non corrupt Monopoly 
profit, Πு. So effectively an increase in ߙ here is a simple transfer which can be interpreted as a bribe. 
In practice a higher ߙ involves buying more Auditor services and this would impact on the underlying 
profit of the Monopolist. Given we have not specified how the underlying profit story unfolds, in order 
to keep the analysis as simple as possible, letting ߙ affect underlying profitability is beyond the scope of 
the paper, although it is readily seen that such an extension need not meaningfully change the nature of 
the results. 
9 By definition, under UPNE1, ߪ(݃∗) < ߪ(݃∗∗) < 1. 
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Proposition 2. The Monopolist optimally selects to increase α by an amount ∆α in 
order to bring about a move from UPNE2 to UPNE1 if: 
Δα < (1 − ߙ)൫1 − ߪ(݃)൯ܨெ{൫1 + ߛ(݃)൯Πெு − ߪ(݃)ܨெ}
 
Definition 8. Let   
߂ߙ ≡ (1 − ߙ)൫1 − ߪ(݃)൯ܨெ{൫1 + ߛ(݃)൯ߎெு − ߪ(݃)ܨெ}
 
Lemma 6. Although it is possible for the denominator of Eq. 9 to be non-positive, for 
{ܥଵ, ܥଶ} to be a UPNE requires that ൫1 + ߛ(݃)൯ߎெு − ߪ(݃)ܨெ > 0, hence where the strategy 
of using ߙ to move from UPNE2 to UPNE1 is feasible, then the denominator of Eq. 9 is 
positive. 
Remark 2. If߂ߙ ∈ (0, ߂ߙ) then the Monopolist can and will optimally raise ߙ to move the 
game from UPNE2 to UPNE1. 
Proposition 3. The range of values of ߂ߙ  which are consistent with the Monopolist 
optimally choosing to stimulate a move from UPNE2 to UPNE1, ߂ߙ ∈ (0, ߂ߙ), is (i) 
decreasing in ߙ, ߎெு  and ߛ(݃) , (ii) increasing in ܨெ  and (iii) may be increasing or 
decreasing in ߪ(݃). 
It follows from Proposition 3(ii) that subject to UPNE1 and UPNE2 both being feasible 
following an increase in ܨெ, such an increase in the fine to the Monopolist will increase the range 
of values of  Δα  which would make a move from UPNE2 to UPNE1 attractive to the 
Monopolist. As we will see later, such an increase in ܨெ will also have a perverse effect on 
the Auditor which reinforces the likelihood of a move from UPNE2 to UPNE1 being feasible 
and optimal. 
3.2    Regulation through fines 
We now ask whether the regulatory body can influence the outcome of the game. The two 
obvious factors that the regulator can manipulate are the fines (to the Auditor (ܨ஺) and the 
Monopolist (ܨெ) upon detection of corruption) and the probability of detection (by investing 
in the detection framework). We begin by examining the impact upon the game of raising the 
penalty to the Monopolist, ܨெ. 
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Proposition 4. Increasing the Monopolist’s fine under detected corruption, ܨெ, can (i) 
eliminate all corruption with a sufficiently high fine, and (ii) perversely, incentivise 
UPNE1 over UPNE2. 
Essentially, Proposition 4(i) refers to a case where ߱(݃) is lowered sufficiently that the 
corruption profile ends up resembling Case 1b illustrated in Figure 5 where ߱௕ᇱ (0) < ߪଵ′(0) 
(߱௕  is the bold grey line). Proposition 4(ii) illustrates one example of the possible non-
monotonicity of UPNEk in ܨெ. This result presents a warning to regulators that increasing 
the fine to the Monopolist upon detection of corruption may have perverse effects if the 
fine is not set sufficiently high. It does, however, also lead to the following Corollary. 
Corollary 1. The regulatory authority can bring about a move from UPNE1 to UPNE2, 
causing the Auditor to be honest instead of supporting Monopoly corruption, by decreasing 
the monopoly penalty, ܨெ. 
We now examine the implications for the game of the regulator increasing the fine to the 
Auditor with corruption detected under UPNE1. 
Proposition 5. Increasing the fine to the Auditor, ܨ஺, on detection of UPNE1 corruption (i) 
unambiguously reduces the range of ݃ ∗ over which the Auditor will choose to be complicit in 
corrupt activities, promoting UPNE2 over UPNE1, (ii) but cannot eliminate UPNE2. 
Hence, sufficiently large fines for the Monopolist (Auditor) can (can not) eliminate 
corruption altogether, though marginal increases in the Monopoly fine can result in the 
Auditor optimally supporting the Monopolist’s corruption where before it was honest. 
3.3    Regulation reducing the corrupt prospect ࢍ∗ 
In this section we briefly consider the potential for the regulator to reduce corruption by 
reducing the size of the discrete corrupt prospect ݃∗  available to the Monopolist. It is 
possible to imagine that regulations which, for instance, reduce the avenues for tax 
avoidance, might present such  an  example. Proposition 6  follows immediately from 
Lemma 4. 
Proposition 6. (i) If the regulatory authority does not know the nature of the corruption 
technology and detection profiles then it cannot predict whether action to reduce the size of the 
Monopolist’s corrupt prospect ݃∗  will improve or worsen the resulting equilibrium as 
understood in Definition 5. (ii) Similarly, if the regulatory authority knows the exact Case ݆ ݅ 
but doesn’t know how sensitive the size of the prospect ݃ ∗ is to a given tightening of its policy 
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then it may not know whether tightening its policy will improve or worsen the resulting 
equilibrium,  for instance leap-frogging the preferred equilibrium into  a  worse equilibrium. 
In other words, even though we have set out to keep the specifications of ߪ(݃) and ߱ (݃) as 
simple as possible, our model gives rise to non-uniform and possibly non-monotonic 
sequences of equilibria for increasing ݃∗  making the outcomes of policy interventions to 
reduce the size of ݃ ∗ unpredictable and risky. 
3.4    Regulation through corruption detection 
Finally, we consider the possibility that the regulator could invest in improving the corruption 
detection framework, raising ߪ(݃). 
Assumption 1. We assume, for simplicity, that investments in improving the corruption 
detection framework cause the profile ߪ(݃) to rise ∀݃ ∈ (0, ො݃) [∀݃ ∈ (0, ∞)] in the case of 
ߪଵ [ߪଶ] so that the properties of the profile under the definition of ߪଵ [ߪଶ] are preserved. 
Under Assumption 1 it follows that if ܶ > ߪ∗∗ so that ݃∗∗ does not exist, then a sufficiently 
large investment in improving detection will eventually yield ܶ < ߪ∗∗ for which there will 
exist an associated ݃∗∗. However, investment in improving detection cannot convert a ߪଶ(݃) 
detection profile into a ߪଵ(݃)  profile: if the initial profile is ߪଶ(݃)  (where the probability of 
detection is always strictly below unity), then under Assumption 1 corruption detection 
investment  can’t generate  an outcome  where  detection of corruption is a certainty. 
We begin by considering the impact of investing in improved detection upon the Auditor. 
Proposition 7. Investment in corruption detection (i) under ߪଵ , and also ߪଶ  for ܶ > ܵ , 
unambiguously reduces the range of ݃∗ for which the Auditor will choose to be complicit 
in corrupt activities, promoting UPNE2 over UPNE1, (ii) under ߪଶ in the case of ܶ ≤ ܵ will 
reduce the range of ݃∗  for which the Auditor will choose to be complicit only if the 
resulting shift in ߪଶ is sufficiently large. 
It follows that investments in improving corruption detection may have no effect upon the 
Auditor unless they are sufficiently large, hence local adjustments in the detection may not 
have any impact upon the range of ߪଶ supporting UPNE2. We now turn our attention to the 
impact of investments in corruption detection on the Monopolist. 
Proposition 8. Investments in improving corruption detection, however large, are completely 
ineffective at eliminating Monopoly corruption or even reducing the range of ݃ ∗ for which 
the Monopolist is corrupt where corruption arises under technology ܽ in the region ߱௔ > 1. 
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Corollary 2. Investments in improving corruption detection are completely ineffective at 
addressing unconstrained UPNE2 under technology ωa. 
Thus, whilst improving detection may deter the Auditor from being complicit in corrupt 
activities, on its own, this policy cannot eliminate all corruption, including possible 
unconstrained corruption. Also, we know from Proposition 7 that such investments will 
eventually deter the Auditor from supporting corrupt activities, hence the most that could be 
achieved with this policy of improving corruption detection is to eliminate UPNE1. UPNE2 
cannot be eliminated in this case, however much investment is undertaken. 
Finally, we show that investments in corruption detection may or may not have any impact 
upon the range of ݃ ∗ over which the Monopolist chooses to be corrupt. We use the idea of 
arbitrarily small changes in corruption detection investment in order to emphasise that after the 
investment the local properties of the model are unchanged and we have not made a shift 
from one Case to another. 
Proposition 9. Arbitrarily small investments in improving corruption detection which 
preserve the original Case ݆݅ (i) are completely ineffective in dealing with Monopolist 
corruption in Case 1݅ with ߱ ᇱ(0) < ߪ′(0); (ii) always reduce the range of ݃ ∗ for which the 
Monopolist chooses to be corrupt under Case 1݅ with ߱௜′(0) > ߪଵ′(0) and ො݃ < ෤݃. 
This reinforces the earlier point that if the policy measure taken by the regulatory body 
is not sufficiently large, it may be completely ineffective (not even having a marginal effect) in 
dealing with corruption. 
4    Conclusions 
Our paper assesses a highly relevant yet relatively neglected aspect of corruption and collusive 
behaviour in relation to corporate firms, as opposed to government agencies, which is the norm 
in this literature. The key driver to the relationship between the firm and the auditor is that 
increasing firm profitability from corruption indirectly increases the demand for consultancy 
services that the auditor provides in addition to auditing services. We demonstrate that a variety 
of equilibria are possible in the game, depending on particular parameterisations: corruption 
by both the firm and the auditor; firm corruption that is controlled by an honest auditor; and, 
honesty by both actors in the model. 
The multiplicity of possible equilibria in the model is interesting in its own right but is 
particularly useful in terms of the analysis of possible policy interventions that are considered 
in the final substantive section. In general terms some of the policy conclusions confirm what 
might be considered intuitively obvious anti-corruption policy. But some of the conclusions are 
less intuitively obvious and reflect firm-auditor interaction. Amongst other things, we show 
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that corruption is indeed an equilibrium of the game under some scenarios and also that, in 
general, it is not possible to say anything about whether a corrupt or honest equilibrium is 
likely to occur for higher or lower levels of corruption activity on offer to the Monopolist: 
under some scenarios the honest (corrupt) equilibrium prevails where the corrupt prospect is 
small (large) and vice versa. In particular, we show that the Monopolist might be able to 
profitably manipulate the consultancy fee it pays to the Auditor to bring about a corrupt 
equilibrium in which the Auditor is complicit. We also show that sufficiently high fines on the 
Monopolist can eliminate corruption but that generally raising the fine incurred by the 
Monopolist can have perverse effects, too. Fining the Auditor, on the other hand, cannot 
eliminate all corruption. Finally, we show that investments in corruption detection (raising 
the probability that corrupt activity is detected and penalised) may be effective at deterring 
Auditor complicity in corrupt activities but may be completely ineffective at addressing 
Monopoly corruption. First, the monopolist can, in principle, ‘bribe’ the auditor by increasing 
consultancy payments. The result here is that the equilibrium of the game can, in principle, be 
shifted from ‘firm corruption that is controlled by an honest auditor’ to ‘corruption by both 
the firm and the auditor’. Secondly, even without the firm strategically buying consultancy 
services, increasing penalties on corrupt firms can be shown to undermine auditor 
honesty; a conclusion that follows from the interactions in the model. It follows that the 
efficiency of the auditing system may be improved by reducing penalties on corrupt firms. 
Consequently it appears that imposing penalties on corrupt firms may be an inefficient policy 
option and should be used in combination with, or replaced by, other policy options. There is the 
obvious option of punishing auditors.  It has been shown here that this unambiguously 
promotes auditor honesty and does not have the perverse effects that can be identified 
when corrupt monopolists are punished. But auditor punishment does not remove firm 
corruption. Instead it results in a more effective auditing system. It follows that possible 
anti-social effects of corruption not considered here (for instance on consumers or other 
economic actors) still exist. A similar conclusion follows from investment in the detection 
of firm corruption. This can be shown to not eliminate corruption instead it promotes 
auditor honesty. 
It is appropriate to mention various policy options that appear intuitively plausible but go 
beyond the confines of the model presented here. First, there is the possibility of making 
penalties endogenous and hence increasing with corrupt gains. This might eventually 
eliminate large scale corruption, but depending on the function used to define the penalties, 
need not eliminate the perverse impacts of firm penalties in general. Another issue that can be 
highlighted involves the non-monotonicity of the equilibria. Without a detailed picture of 
the relevant corruption detection and technology profiles it is not possible to say whether 
policies aimed at ‘getting tough’ on corruption are necessary, productive or indeed, 
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counterproductive. This is interesting and counterfactual to the prevailing popular narrative 
aiming for (further) penal regulatory responses. 
Appendix A: Proofs 
Proof of Lemma 1.  
By assumption (i) ܨ஺ and Δܿ are strictly positive, hence (ii) ߮ᇱ(ߪ) = ிಲଵିఙ +
ఙிಲା୼௖
(ଵିఙ)మ > 0 and 
(ii) ߮ᇱ′(ߪ) = 2 ிಲ(ଵିఙ)మ + 2
ఙிಲା୼௖
(ଵିఙ)య > 0 . (iii) Since ܨ஺  and Δܿ  are exogenous and finite, 
limఙ→ଵష ଵଵିఙ = 0, and so limఙ→ଵష ߮(ߪ) = ∞ . (iv) Given ߪ ∈ [0,1], then 
డఝ(ఙ)
డிಲ ≥ 0 and డఝ(ఙ)
డ୼௖ > 0. 
Proof of Lemma 2.  
First, note that ߮(ߪ(݃))  is the L.H.S. of Eqs. 6a and 7a and so by Definition 2 
߮൫ߪ(݃∗∗)൯ = ߙܨெ and the Agent is indifferent between being corrupt and honest. Given, 
from Lemma 1 ߮(ߪ) is positive monotonic and strictly convex such that it is asymptotic to 
ߪ = 1, ߮(ߪ) = ߙܨெ  must occur for ߪ ∈ (0,1), as ߙܨெ  is finite. Further, since ߪ௝(݃) is 
positive monotonic for ߪ < 1, if ݃ ∗ < [>]݃∗∗ then ߪ∗ < [>]ߪ∗∗ and ߮(ߪ) < [>]ߙܨெ, hence 
the Auditor will support corruption [be honest]. 
Proof of Lemma 3.  
Given Πெு  and ܨெ are strictly positive and exogenous, the proof follows from the properties of 
ߛ(݃). 
Proof of Lemma 5. 
(i) It is sufficient to note that under Case 1݅, ߪଵ(݃) reaches unity at ො݃ which guarantees the 
Auditor will not support corruption at that point or for higher g. (ii) Since 
lim௚→ஶ ߱௔(݃) = ܸ > 1, under Case1ܽ, the reward to corruption for the Monopolist is 
always sufficient to compensate for the fine which results with certainty under Auditor 
honesty. (iii) Since lim௚→ஶ ߱௔(݃) = ܸ > 1  ensuring the Monopolist will choose 
corruption regardless of the Auditor’s decision. (iv) This follows from (iii) with UPNE1 
(UPNE2) being unconstrained if at the limit, ߪଶ  does not (does) reach the level ߪ(݃∗∗) 
required to make  the  Auditor honest. (v) This  is  an  extension  of  (iv),  though  with ߱௕, 
corruption requires ߱ ௕ > ߪଶ as ݃ → ∞, and hence ܵ > ܶ. 
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Proof of Proposition 1.  
Let ߱(݃∗) at some initial level of ߙ be ߱(݃∗, ߙ) where ߱(݃∗, ߙ) > ߪ(݃∗). Accordingly, let 
ߪ(݃∗) > ߪ(݃∗∗, ߙ) so that we have UPNE2 at ߙ. Increasing ߙ shifts ߙܨெ (in Figure 2) to the 
left raising ߪ(݃∗∗). However, given ߱(݃∗, ߙ) > ߪ(݃∗), it follows there exists some ∆ߙ > 0 
such that ߱(݃∗, ߙ + ∆ߙ) > ߪ(݃∗). If ߪ(݃∗∗, ߙ) is sufficiently close to ߪ(݃∗), then ߪ(݃∗∗, ߙ +
∆ߙ) < ߪ(݃∗), hence yielding UPNE1. 
Proof of Proposition 2.  
It is required to show that the (risk-neutral) Monopolist’s expected profit under UPNE1 
with ߙ + ∆ߙ is greater than the Monopolist’s profit under UPNE2 with ߙ. Replacing ߙ in Eq. 
5a with ߙ + ∆ߙ and comparing with Eq. 2a we have Eq. 9. 
Proof of Lemma 6.  
From Eq.  6b UPNE1 requires that ߱(݃) > ߪ(݃), hence ஈಾಹிಾ ߛ(݃) > ߪ(݃).  Multiplying by 
ܨெ and rearranging, we have ߛ(݃)Πெு − ߪ(݃)ܨெ>0, hence 1 + ߛ(݃)Πெு − ߪ(݃)ܨெ>0. 
Proof of Proposition 3.  
(i) This follows directly from the observation that −ߙ appears only in the numerator of Eq. 9 
whilst ߛ(݃) and Πெு  both appear only in the denominator of Eq. 9 with positive coefficients, 
hence the respective partial derivatives of ∆ߙ  in each Case are negative. (ii) This follows 




(1 − ߙ)൫1 − ߪ(݃)൯[൫1 + ߛ(݃)൯Πெு ]
{. }ଶ > 0 
 
where {.} is the denominator in Eq.  9, and given the assumptions of the model, the 




൫1 − ߪ(݃)൯ − [൫1 + ߛ(݃)൯Πெு − ߪ(݃)ܨெ]
{. }ଶ  
 
the first term in the numerator ൫1 − ߪ(݃)൯ is non-negative by the assumptions of the model and 
[.] is also positive from Lemma 6. 
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Proof of Proposition 4.  
(i) For {ܥଵ, ܥଶ}  to be UPNE requires, from Eq. 6a, that ߱(݃) ≡ ఊ(௚)ஈಾ
ಹ
ிಾ > ߪ(݃)  and for 
{ܥଵ, ܪଶ}  to be UPNE requires, from Eq. 7b, that ߱(݃) ≡ ఊ(௚)ஈಾ
ಹ
ிಾ > 1. Hence, to rule out 
UPNE1 and UPNE2, respectively requires that ߪ(݃)ܨெ > Πெு  and ܨெ > Πெு . (ii) Let ߱(݃) at 
some initial level of ܨெ  be ߱(݃, ܨெ) , where ߱(݃, ܨெ) > ߪ(݃) . Accordingly, let ߪ(݃∗) >
ߪ(݃∗∗, ܨெ) so that we have UPNE2. Increasing ܨெ shifts ߙܨெ in Figure 2 to the left raising 
ߪ(݃∗∗). However, given ߪ(݃∗, ܨெ) > ߪ(݃∗), it follows there exists some ∆ܨெ > 0 such that 
߱(݃∗, ܨெ + ∆ܨெ) > ߪ(݃∗) . If ߪ(݃∗∗, ܨெ)  is sufficiently close to ߪ(݃∗) , then ߪ(݃∗∗, ܨெ +
∆ܨெ) < ߪ(݃∗), hence yielding UPNE1. 
Proof of Proposition 5.  
(i) This follows straightforwardly from Definition 2. Increasing ܨ஺  raises ߮(ߪ)  for 
∀ߪ ∈ (0,1) . Since, from Eq. 6a, UPNE1 requires that ߮(ߪ) < ߙܨெ ,  increasing ߮(ߪ) 
reduces ߪ(݃∗∗) , the supremum of the set of ߪ(݃)  for which the Auditor would support 
Monopoly corruption. (ii) This follows straightforwardly from the observation that ܨ஺ does 
not feature in the Monopolist’s condition for UPNE2. 
Proof of Proposition 7.  
(i) For this proof it is convenient to exploit the strict monotonicity of ߪ(݃) [ߪᇱ(݃) > 0] for 
ߪ ∈ [0,1)] [ߪ ∈ (0, ∞)] under ߪଵ [ߪଶ]. This allows us to invert the function giving ݃(ߪ) for 
ߪଵ ∈ [0,1)  and ߪଶ ∈ [0, ܶ) . Under ߪଵ , ߪ(݃∗∗) ∈ (0,1)  exists and under ߪଶ  with ܶ > ܵ , 
ߪ(݃∗∗) ∈ (0, ܶ) exists . Hence, inverting the function we can say in each case ݃(ߪ∗∗) exists. 
Given ߪ∗∗ is determined by the interaction of ߮(ߪ) and ߙܨெ, neither of which are affected by 
raising the ߪ(݃)  profile, then ߪ∗∗  is constant. However, an upward shift in ߪଵ(݃)  for 
ߪ ∈ (0,1) implies ݃(ߪ∗∗), and hence ݃∗∗ , falls. A similar argument holds for an upward 
shift in ߪଶ  for ߪ ∈ (0, ܶ). Since the Auditor’s complicity in corruption requires that ݃∗ ∈
(0, ݃∗∗)  the range of values of ݃∗  consistent with Auditor complicity has fallen. (ii) It is 
sufficient to note that under ߪଶ in the case of ܶ ≤ ܵ, ߪ∗∗ lies strictly above ߪଶ ∀݃ ∈ [0, ∞), 
hence ݃ ∗∗ does not exist. However, since ߪ∗∗ is fixed and lies in the open interval (0,1) there 
always exists a ߪ > ߪ∗∗  in the interval (0,1) . Hence, a sufficiently large investment in 
improving detection will eventually shift ߪଶ upwards raising T above S so that ݃∗∗ exists. 
This reduces the interval of ݃∗ under which the Auditor will be complicit in corruption from 
(0, ∞) to (0, ݃∗∗). Further improvements in corruption detection will then have the effect 
described in (i). 
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Proof of Proposition 8.  
This follows straight forwardly from the observation that UPNE2 requires ߱ > ߪ but since 
߱ > 1 and ߪ  is constrained to lie at or below 1, any feasible increase in ߪ  will not be 
enough to reverse the inequality between ߪ and ߱. 
Proof of Proposition 9.  
(i) This follows directly from the fact that under Case 1 the only corrupt equilibrium is UPNE2 
where ߱௔ > 1 , which, from Proposition 8, we know cannot be affected by detection 
investments. (ii) First, if ݃∗∗ > ݃̅  then Monopolist corruption occurs if ݃∗ ∈ (0, ݃̅) . 
Investing in improving corruption detection will raise ߪଵ(݃) hence reducing ݃̅ and with it the 
upper limit of ݃ ∗ consistent with Monopolist corruption. Second, if ݃ ∗∗ ≤ ݃̅ then Monopolist 
corruption occurs if ݃ ∗ ∈ (0, ݃∗∗). Investing in improving corruption detection raises ߪଵ(݃), 
which by Proposition 7(i) reduces ݃∗∗ , and with it the upper limit of ݃∗  consistent with 
Monopolist corruption. 
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